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Private law theory and taxonomy: reframing the debate 
 
Duncan Sheehan and TT Arvind* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past half-century, theoretical debates about private law in England and the 
commonwealth have increasingly come to be about taxonomy.  In its broadest sense, 
taxonomy refers to three things. Firstly, it refers to the selection of sets of ideas, categories 
and concepts used to describe and order the subject of study. Is private law better 
understood as being about contract, tort and restitution, or about labour relations, trade 
relations, financial relations and consumer relations? Secondly, it refers to the basis on 
which we constitute and give content to these concepts and categories.  Do ‘risk’, 
‘distribution’ and ‘policy’ influence the question of whether a duty of care exists?  Thirdly, it 
refers to the relationship between the various categories, concepts and ideas we use to 
describe the area of study.  How does the category ‘contract’ relate to the category ‘unjust 
enrichment’?  Should the fact that a situation can be brought within the former category 
mean that it should be excluded from the latter category? 
Virtually all recent debates in private law in these jurisdictions relate to one of these three 
matters. The positions taken, too, tend to involve the same two opposing camps. On one 
side are theorists who we term ‘interpretivist’, a label accepted by some of the most 
prominent members of this school1 (though by no means all) as well as some at least of their 
opponents.2  There are significant differences amongst these theorists – who include private 
law scholars such as Stephen Smith3 and Allan Beever – but they share in common a 
preference for categories based on high-order, ‘timeless’ principles that are normatively 
justifiable and of general applicability; a methodology that uses these as the basis for 
generating lower-order rules to determine the results in particular contexts; and a suspicion 
of ‘policy’ as a means of avoiding proper analysis of the principles and rationale of the law.4 
In jurisprudential terms, they take inspiration from the work of Peter Birks on logic, taxonomy 
and structure in private law.5  The school also has a loose connection with the thinking of 
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Ronald Dworkin,6 although some within the School explicitly reject him for a more positivist 
outlook. 
On the other side are theorists we term ‘contextualists’. Members of this camp, such as 
Steve Hedley7, Stephen Waddams,8 and Hanoch Dagan9 also differ on important points, but 
they too share a range of characteristics. Their work tends to focus on categories such as 
“the family home”,10 which are smaller, more contextual, and have significant room for policy. 
Their approach to individual cases likewise focuses heavily on the factual context of the 
case, and relatively less on the high-order principles involved.  Although they do not deny 
the existence of categories like contract or restitution – indeed Hedley wrote a textbook on 
restitution11 - they deny the value in over-theorising or over-generalising the nature of these 
categories, and tend to be less interested in seeking to eliminate overlaps between 
categories. Hedley, for example, accepts no single normative explanation of contract and 
has described the law of contract as “too vast and complicated for such generalisations”.12 In 
constructing his own taxonomy in a 1988 article13 he lists a diverse range of interests that 
the law protects, such as personal dignity and land. Whilst Dagan has a different approach, 
the linking commonality is that he too argues for a focus on local policies and norms.14  In 
jurisprudential terms, their work typically has a connection with legal realism. 
Yet, as we show in this article, despite the intellectual energy with which the debate has 
been conducted, it has been flawed by two fundamental mistakes, which have led to the 
opposing camps talking past each other.  The first of these relates to the purpose of legal 
taxonomy.  The importance of classification comes from the fact that the operation of private 
law requires judges and jurists to separate incidents that carry legal consequences from 
incidents that do not, and incidents that carry one type of consequence from those that carry 
another type.  Legal categories and concepts seek to assist with this process, and 
taxonomies have been controversial precisely because they would alter the outcomes of 
future cases.  Despite this, little attention has been paid to the question of how legal 
taxonomies are actually used.  As we show in Part 2, this is regrettable.  How we build a 
taxonomy depends on why we build a taxonomy, and a focus on this question produces an 
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approach to the construction and use of legal categories that differs in significant respects 
from the approaches that currently dominate private law theory.   
The second mistake is even more far-reaching, and relates to the manner in which legal 
concepts are used in contemporary private law.15  Theorists from all sides frame their 
categories in conceptual terms, but have tended to misuse concepts.  Some theorists treat 
concepts as plain facts (Birks was one) or in terms of definition (Hart for example), and those 
interpretivists influenced by positivism also tend to think in definitional terms or in terms of 
“meaning”. This is wrong. We argue in part 3 that common law legal concepts are ideal 
types – they are purely theoretical representative constructs and not real world facts at all.  
We draw on theories of concepts to argue that this means that understanding a concept 
requires us to examine not just the concept itself, but also the circumstances and cases to 
which the concept applies. Both the “intension” and the “extension” of a concept are relevant 
in a way that private law theorists have not generally recognised.  
To work in terms of intension and extension has one further implication. In the final part, we 
argue the concepts used in law change both in terms of their intension and their extension. 
This means that we cannot work with static concepts, but must have an understanding of 
concepts that is developmental, and builds in a sense of direction of development which 
reflect the theoretical claims we make about the law. Precisely how that is to be done is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but we indicate how the debate can be reframed in a more 
helpful and constructive manner.   
 
2.  Taxonomies and hard cases 
A. The purpose of taxonomy 
The shape of a taxonomy depends on its purpose.  The classification of animals according 
to the principles of the Jewish rules of kashrut or in the terms of the Animals Act 1971 bear 
little resemblance to the modern Linnaean classification.  This does not mean that they are 
wrong – it simply reflects the fact that how we classify depends on why we classify.  In much 
the same way, we may seek to classify the law for a range of purposes – dividing up the 
undergraduate curriculum, organising the work of the Law Commission, planning the order 
of a statute book or a legal encyclopaedia – each of which will lend itself to a different 
approach to classification.16  
This point is not alien to legal theory, but the taxonomies that have been the subject of so 
much controversy in private law scholarship recently have a generally narrow focus. Their 
primary concern has been with the type of question that, in continental scholarship, is 
sometimes called de sententia ferenda – how the legal system should deal with an 
undecided issue.  The debate around legal taxonomies has been closely connected to 
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disagreements about whether particular outcomes would be desirable in particular types of 
case, or whether they would lead judges to consider irrelevant factors while ignoring relevant 
ones. The debate around unjust enrichment and equity in Australia is a particularly clear 
example of how differences as to taxonomy tend to reflect differing views as to what a court 
ought to or ought not to be swayed by.  Similarly, the Birksian project to erect a law of unjust 
enrichment on English soil has been controversial at least in part because it opened the door 
to considering a range of factors that would not earlier have been considered relevant, and 
to granting remedies that would previously not have been available.  
The connection between taxonomies and hard cases has important implications for our 
understanding of the form and subject of taxonomies. Hard cases manifest at least one of 
three types of epistemic uncertainty.  Firstly, they may be characterised by a lack of clarity 
as to which sets of legal rules are the correct ones to apply (is a particular commercial 
dispute one in which we should applying rules from the law of trusts - as in a Quistclose trust 
for example - or should it be decided purely on the basis of the law of contract?).  Secondly, 
hard cases may be characterised by a lack of clarity as to the precise content of a legal rule, 
standard or concept (what does ‘common intention’ mean in the context of the ‘common 
intention’ constructive trust?).  Finally, they may reflect a lack of clarity as to the effect of 
applying a given set of legal rules, standards or concepts to a novel set of facts (can a 
‘without prejudice’ draft evidence consent?).   
In each case, however, the question relates not to a rule as such, but to the problem of 
subsuming a particular instance under the appropriate rule – a question which is, to put it in 
Kantian terms, one of judgment rather than deductive logic.17 Taxonomies, in consequence, 
are concerned not simply with classifying rules but with shedding light on the factors which a 
judge should ignore in deciding a case, the factors he should take into account, the weight 
he should attach to these factors, and the effect of taking these factors into account – i.e., 
whether they tilt the balance in favour of the claimant or the defendant.  A legal taxon is in 
consequence associated with a set of legally relevant factors.  Classifying a case as 
belonging to one taxon rather than another affects the outcome by changing the factors that 
a judge is required to take into account in deciding the case, as well as the factors by which 
he is not supposed to be swayed.  The classification of a legal issue as belonging to the 
domain of unjust enrichment rather than equity as traditionally conceived, or to equity rather 
than contract can change both who wins the case and what remedy the winner gets because 
matters that are relevant to considering whether a particular action or outcome is “against 
conscience” will not be relevant to considering whether they were within the terms of a 
contract.18 
 
This has important consequences for how we conceptualise the form of taxonomic projects, 
in that it suggests that Birks’ influential biological analogies only present a partial picture of 
legal taxonomy. Birks argued that a sequence such as terrestrial, arboreal, aquatic is wrong, 
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because arboreal is also terrestrial.19  Similarly, failing to distinguish between a wrong and 
an unjust enrichment will lead to analytical errors and drawing parallels that are superficial at 
best.  Both Steve Hedley and Geoffrey Samuel have responded to this use of biological 
analogies,20 but the deeper point is that the analogy is false because taxonomy in law, unlike 
biological taxonomy, is designed to affect and alter its subject matter.  Biological taxonomies 
have no real implications for how the biosphere functions, because changing the manner in 
which an organism is classified does not change anything about the organism.  Whether 
fungi are classified as a part of the plant kingdom or the animal kingdom, for example, does 
not affect the fungi themselves, or the manner in which they grow or evolve.  This is not true 
of law, because taxonomy in law is about how we treat the subject of our taxonomy: we will, 
for example, remedy a breach through expectation damages once we classify it as 
contractual. That is a central reason for engaging in the process of taxonomy.  
If we seek analogies outside the domain of law, therefore, prescriptive grammar is a better 
starting point than biology. A prescriptive grammarian, through classifying words and 
formulating rules in relation to how a category is to be used, is trying to influence the 
treatment of the subject of his taxonomy.  A grammarian who classifies a noun as falling in 
the fourth declension (or argues that it should be treated as such) is telling her audience to 
use a different inflection in the ablative plural than they would have done if they thought it 
third declension. Likewise, in saying that a sentence should not be ended with a preposition, 
or that an infinitive should not be split by the insertion of an adverb, prescriptive 
grammarians are telling their audience that they should use language in a particular way. 
Critically, a prescriptive grammarian does not devise an 'ideal' system of rules of her own 
making: writing a prescriptive grammar is different from inventing a constructed language 
like Esperanto or Quenya, in that the prescriptive grammarian takes usage as her starting 
point, attempts to detect regularities in usage, and selects amongst competing usages in 
existing language to formulate a rule declaring one particular usage to be the one that most 
commends itself for wider adoption.  As we will see in the next section, this has considerable 
implications for legal taxonomy. 
 
B. Descriptive, Developmental and Prescriptive Taxonomies 
The analogy with grammar points to an important divide between ways of using taxonomies.  
A taxonomy may be intended to be purely descriptive – a snapshot in time of the law, akin to 
a descriptive grammar of a language at a particular point of time.  Classification of the law 
for the organisation of a hypothetical Everyman’s Own Lawyer, or an encyclopaedia of law, 
or a statute book, or the foundational subjects on the undergraduate curriculum, tends to 
reflect such an approach.   
Alternatively a taxonomy can be constructed to be developmental. A key component of the 
distinction between developmental and descriptive taxonomies is that developmental 
taxonomies see the law as being in a process of change.  Such taxonomies are therefore 
                                                     
19
 Birks (n 5) 20 
20
 S Hedley 'The Taxonomic Approach to Restitution' in A Hudson (ed) New Perspectives on Property Law 
Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish London 2003) 151, 153; G Samuel 'Can Gaius really be Compared to 
Darwin?' (2000) 49 ICLQ 297 
6 
 
dynamic rather than static, and are concerned both with the process of change and the 
current appearance of the law.  They seek to capture not just the law as it is at this instant, 
but, unlike descriptive taxonomies, also the direction of its development.  
Finally, a taxonomy can be constructed to be prescriptive.  Prescriptive taxonomies 
distinguish themselves from developmental taxonomies in that they are not concerned with 
the process of legal change.  They are, instead, used to ‘correct’ the law by pointing to the 
right answer in instances where they believe the law has gotten the answer wrong.  Whilst 
these taxonomies go beyond mere description, they lack the dynamic dimension of 
developmental taxonomies. In other words they tell us what the right answer is, but not how 
we should get there.   
Taxonomies constructed by legal realists – and therefore some at least of our contextualist 
theorists – are usually developmental.  Realists see the law as responding to the same 
social trends that drive social change. The law is not static, and the categories used in 
analysing the law must therefore be able to account for and shed light on the direction in 
which it develops. As the normative underpinnings of different areas respond to social 
change, so too do the bases of legal categories. Realists, accordingly, orient their categories 
around identifying the values and goals (often conflicting) that underlie or are implicated in 
the development of the law, exploring the choices between these which the legal system 
reflects, and their implications for a given type of case. Atiyah’s argument about reorienting 
contract around reliance21 is a classic, albeit unsuccessful, example. The result, as Dagan 
puts it, is that the realist taxonomic enterprise is “both backward and forward looking, 
constantly challenging the continued validity and desirability of the normative underpinnings 
of existing legal categories.”22   
Resistance to developmental taxonomies comes principally from the classificatory work of 
positivist-influenced interpretivists.23 Many such theorists are happy to accept the charge 
that formalist positivist taxonomies tend to be purely descriptive.24  Smith25 says that a theory 
of law can be historical, descriptive, prescriptive or interpretive.26 Historical analyses 
examine the law as history – for example, an explanation of contract as reflecting the 
changing forces of production in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.27 A descriptive 
analysis says the law is x. A prescriptive one provides an account of an ideal law, saying, “It 
doesn’t matter that it’s x - it ought to be y.”  An interpretivist analysis, by contrast, is in his 
account one which enhances our understanding of the law by highlighting its significance or 
meaning, by identifying the important features of the law and by identifying connections 
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between them but, as Smith himself concedes,28 the difference between descriptive and 
interpretive theories is one of degree not kind because interpretivists, too, theorise about the 
law and what it actually is.  Other interpretivists are more explicitly prescriptive.  Allan 
Beever and Charles Rickett, for example, in their review of Stephen Waddams’ book29 argue 
that what is important is not why a judge decided the way he did, not what his reasons were, 
but what they should have been.30 This suggests that their methodology and taxonomies 
based on it are statically prescriptive.  
This is problematic, because only developmental taxonomies are capable of being used for 
the purposes the classificatory project claims to pursue. Descriptive taxonomies are of little 
use in hard or controversial cases – which, as discussed in the previous section, are the 
main focus of classificatory projects – because they shed little light on the epistemic 
uncertainty that characterises these cases: It is only once a case has been decided that we 
can comfortably describe it. Somewhat less obviously, a purely prescriptive taxonomy, too, 
is of limited use in hard or controversial cases. The implicit basis upon which interpretivist 
theorists advance prescriptive taxonomies appears to be that such a taxonomy classifies the 
law according to the ‘right answer’, which the courts would have arrived at had they only 
gone about the task appropriately.  
Talk of a “right answer” suggests a link with Dworkin . Hercules looks at the cases that seem 
relevant to the scenario he has before him, and see which cases fit – are consistent with – 
the hypotheses he has. The process of justification entails his examining those solutions 
which meet a minimum fit requirement to see if they are morally justified results. As with 
realist approaches, Hercules’ is backwards looking in terms of fit, but forward looking in 
terms of creating an attractive framework for future judges, thus rendering the approach 
dynamic and developmental. The combination of these two standards of assessment leads 
to Hercules’ identifying a single correct answer.31 Both contexualists and Dworkin hold that 
legal rules not only enable judges to decide cases, but also constrain them from being 
unduly influenced by their own preferred position in situations where morality and principle 
are contested. Dworkin’s account places at its heart the special institutional morality that is 
generated by accreted legal practice in a system;32 he describes legal rights as those that 
can be enforced in a court,33 distinguishing them from purely moral rights. Contextualist 
accounts place emphasis on the policies that form part of the relevant legal system, and on 
what Llewellyn called the court’s “sense of the situation”.34 Contextualists and Dworkinians 
agree that these constraints are not absolute, but are nevertheless real and fundamental to 
the legal system, although they may disagree as to how the constraints actually operate. 
Thus realists do not, in rejecting the suggestion that rules lead to a single right answer, 
                                                     
28
 Ibid 6; Dagan has suggested that “doctrinalist taxonomies” as he calls them are primarily descriptive; Dagan 
(n 22) 160; Dworkin’s theory has elements of description and prescription according to K Kress ‘The 
Interpretive Turn’ (1987) 97 Ethics 834 
29
 Waddams (n 8). 
30
 Beever and Rickett (n 1) 327 
31
 Eg R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth London 1978) 290 
32
 R Dworkin Law’s Empire (HUP Cambridge Mass 1986) 407-409 
33
 Ibid 405-406 
34
 K Llewellyn ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are 
to be Construed’ (1949) 3 Vanderbilt L Rev 395, 396 
8 
 
mean that rules are ineffectual. Rather, they hold that that their effect is to identify a number 
of potentially correct or good decisions, one of which the judge then selects.  
The absence of a dynamic dimension to prescriptive taxonomies leads to their being less 
grounded in existing law than developmental taxonomies are; a prescriptive taxonomist is far 
readier than a developmental taxonomist to reject the reasoning by which a court arrives at 
its decision, because a prescriptive taxonomist’s concern is not so much the interpretation 
that the courts put on the law, or the processes by which actual courts deciding new cases 
engage with the materials provided by past cases, as it is what the law should be.  The 
result is a view of the role of the jurist and taxonomist that is in many ways closer to the 
Franco-civilian model of a person who expounds the law with some reference to what courts 
say, but without regarding the courts as the ultimate founts of the law: logic, rationality and 
philosophical or normative reflection are as important as case law is, and jurists constructing 
prescriptive taxonomies sometimes favour the latter over a consistent position taken in the 
case law. A particularly egregious example is Birks’ description of the entire law of knowing 
receipt as in effect misconceived. A knowing receipt claim comes about where a trustee 
misappropriates trust property which finds its way into a third party’s hands and the trust 
beneficiary wishes to sue despite the defendant’s having himself spent the money.35 In his 
last book Birks said that  
One consequence of the long failure to recognise the law of unjust enrichment is a 
misguided intuitive resistance to the strict liability it requires... this error... is the only 
possible explanation of the fact that as against a recipient out of possession those 
who have only equitable title behind a trust have been confined to a fault-based 
claim.36 
This is perfectly adequate if taxonomy is intended to principally contribute one perspective to 
a law reform project – for example, to inform the work of the Law Commission – but it is 
insufficient for the purposes which the taxonomy project claims to pursue. It is not credible to 
expect that the Supreme Court will throw over all the case law on knowing receipt and 
introduce a strict liability unjust enrichment claim in its place.37 Taxonomies that seek to be 
useful for purposes other than law reform must not only prescribe an ideal answer, but also 
chart a path by which the legal system gets from its current position to the proposed 
position.  Birks appeared to reject the idea that he needed to do any such thing, saying that 
“history could not justify the muddle it had made”,38 thus implying that some clean break 
needed to be made. Yet a taxonomy must not only do chart the path to the right answer, it 
must do so in a way that retains the distinction between the views of a situation taken by the 
legal system, and those which an individual judge deciding without the law might be inclined 
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to take.  Doing this requires looking beyond logic and rationality,39 and manifesting a far 
stronger notion of grounding than prescriptive taxonomies typically have. 
It is this that makes it plausible to say that a more explicit link with Dworkin would improve 
interpretivist thinking. Dworkin’s emphasis on keeping faith with the past, and on developing 
the law by putting cases in the best possible light, makes his approach explicitly dynamic 
and developmental, unlike the statically prescriptive method that characterises private law 
interpretivism.  This dynamic dimension allows theorists to move the law in a direction that is 
more philosophically or morally justifiable, without having to declare centuries of case law 
‘wrong’ as prescriptive approaches do.  Interpretivists would then be able to maintain the 
greater importance of principles and rights over more context dependent factors, while also 
being more grounded in the past applications of concepts and principles. 
 
3. Concepts and Taxonomies 
How, then, do we construct a developmental taxonomy?  What sort of things might it 
include?  What are the bases of its taxa? The taxonomic divide in the common law world is 
usually portrayed as being between ‘conceptual’ taxonomies which tend to focus on the 
philosophical or moral principles underlying the law, and hence appeal to broad, 'timeless' 
categories – contracts, wrongs, property – on the one hand, and ‘contextual’ taxonomies 
which focus on the social context of the law and the adaptation of the law to social change, 
and hence tend to appeal to more socially grounded categories. This description, however, 
misrepresents the real nature of the divide.  As Twining pointed out at the very start of the 
modern debate, the categories – “employment”, “power”, “vulnerability” – that form the basis 
of contextual taxonomies are every bit as conceptual as those that form the basis of 
interpretive categories.40 The debate is, rather, about the nature of the concepts we use, 
how we derive their content, and how we apply them to decide what sets of things fall within 
the bounds of a concept and what do not. The first question then is how do we construct the 
concepts we use? The first subsection of this part aims to answer this question and to 
describe the way in which the sub-parts of a concept interrelate.  The second subsection 
looks at how that understanding impacts of the development of our taxonomies.  
A. The Construction of Concepts  
(i) Individuating Concepts  
 
We individuate concepts in order to define and distinguish one from another. At the heart of 
the interpretivist approach lies an approach to individuating concepts41 that seeks to 
understand (and hence individuate) them in terms of their meaning42 or “significance”.  It is 
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this approach – looking for some inherent quality of the concept that separates it from other 
concepts – that divides the interpretivist approach from the contextualist approach. 
Contextualists do not worry so much about their being some inherent quality about a 
concept, because they are more interested in its application in particular circumstances. 
This still does not tell us what a concept is. For our purposes it seems helpful to say that we 
can define a concept by way of what it contains.43 The concept of estoppel for example will 
contain a notion of representation, a notion of detriment, and a notion of reliance. Those 
three (at least) notions come together and interact in a given way. They are the sub-
concepts that make up estoppel. Although representation turns up elsewhere in the law – 
false representation might be part of the concept of deceit – the interaction of the sub-
concepts in estoppel is unique to estoppel. We can define a concept as a unique collection 
or interrelationship between sub-concepts or ideas. Atomic or irreducible concepts, if they 
exist, cannot be individuated in this way, but it may be that we can question whether this 
type of legal concept exists. For Dworkin at least the process of interpretation never ends, 
and, if so, the process of individuation never (in principle) ends.44  
There is therefore an important philosophical difficulty with the claimed approach of 
interpretivism in looking at the “meaning” or “significance” of a concept. A theory of concepts 
and a theory of language and meaning are different.45 Words have meanings; concepts do 
not. Rather, they have referents, or things they designate. We have, therefore, to distinguish 
between a concept’s intension – the set of conditions that a thing must satisfy to fall under 
the concept – and its extension – the sets of things that are designated by the concept or 
‘fall under’ the concept. Thus, returning to our estoppel example, the intension is the 
interrelationship of the three sub-parts – reliance, representation and detriment. The 
extension is the set of factual scenarios in which I find myself estopped. Two concepts may 
share one, but not another.  Frege gave the example of the names for the planet Venus.  
“Morning Star” and “Evening Star” clearly do not mean the same thing, but in conceptual 
terms designate the same thing.46 They have the same extension, but not the same 
intension. Specifying a concept, therefore, requires engaging both with its intension and its 
extension, because it is not possible to say whether a concept expresses a given predicate 
or referent merely from extensional information as two concepts may have the same 
extension but different intension;47 it seems harder to say that two can have the same 
intension, but different extensions; however, we still need to engage with both as different 
principles and rationales will have different weight, as we see later, in different factual 
circumstances. The extension tells us much about the proper construction of the intension.  
It is, as Frege points out, misleading to look at the intension without considering the 
extension. 
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Legal taxonomies are therefore concerned with both intension and extension.  Yet 
interpretivists are more inclined to examine the intension and contextualists the extension. 
We see this in the way realist accounts of concepts tend to minimise the internal component 
of intension. This seems to be true, at least to some extent, whatever our variant of realism. 
For Llewellyn legal concepts were “refreshed with the concrete facts of daily practice” and 
the importance of context was to deal with the inherently indeterminate nature of concepts.48 
This concentration on one or the other contributes to our failure to communicate. All 
classificatory systems in law seek to explain the basis of the categories they construct, 
whether those categories are called ‘contract’, ‘tort’ and ‘’restitution’;49 or ‘labour’, ‘land’, 
‘chattels’ and ‘money’;50 or ‘human need’ and ‘interest-conflict’;51 or ‘commercial 
transactions’, ‘consumer transactions’, ‘individual finance’ and ‘industrial finance’,52 and so 
must engage with intension. They must also engage with the factual circumstances covered 
by a given taxon – in other words, with extension. The role of intension and extension in the 
individuation of a concept underlines the sterility of the distinction between ‘conceptual’ and 
‘fact-based’ taxonomies. To the extent any taxonomy will need to deal with both intension 
and extension, it will need to have room for both types of category.  
(ii) Ideal Types  
 
How, then, do we go from extension to intension?  Much of the debate about taxonomy  has 
appeared to assume, implicitly and probably without conscious thought, that the concepts 
that are used to constitute legal categories (‘tort’) should represent ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ 
instances of the underlying phenomena (‘wrongs’).  This might be described in Weberian 
terms as an average type. An average type isolates those phenomena that exist in the 
greatest number of cases and if possible allows us to arrive at a mean and thus find a 
reasonably accurate depiction of the typical case.53   The concepts from which legal taxa are 
constructed, however, not only radically simplify the multifaceted phenomena they represent, 
but do so in a way that means they do not depict, or even seek to depict, ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ 
instances of their object. They depict, rather, what Weber termed ‘ideal types’ of that object. 
Ideal types are purely mental constructs that model certain aspects of social reality and help 
us to explain particular historical conditions, but which do not exist in pure form.54   
An ideal type’s relationship to empirical reality is problematic in every case.55  Weber pointed 
out that every object treated as an instance of an ideal type will deviate from the ideal. The 
perfect charismatic leader, for example, does not exist.  Nevertheless, Weber argued that 
ideal types were profoundly useful, because they made it possible for researchers to 
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“analyse historically unique configurations… by means of genetic concepts.”56  Perfect 
competition, for instance, is an ideal type which models human behaviour in circumstances 
that have never and will never exist,57 but that is what gives it its utility.   
This applies equally to legal concepts such as ‘contracts’.  Seen in purely naturalistic terms, 
every contract differs from every other in important ways, with the result that a completely 
specified category ‘contract’ would be infinitely complex. In factual terms, every contract will 
possess a mix of the elements rival theories have emphasised as being the constitutive 
essence of the category, including ‘promise’,58 ‘consent’,59 ‘reliance’,60 ‘regulatory 
framework’61 and ‘projection of uncertainty into the future.’62  In selecting one of these as the 
primary point around which one organises a theory of contract, the researcher asserts the 
peculiar significance of that characteristic for the legal system in determining how to deal 
with a particular factual problem that has arisen. 
This last point is of particular significance.  There is no inherently correct way of building an 
ideal type. Every ideal type is a synthesis of “one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints” which 
create a utopian (or dystopian) depiction of the type.  Very varied criteria can be and have 
been applied by theorists of differing persuasions to select the characteristics used in 
constructing an ideal view of a particular phenomenon.63  The pertinent consideration is not 
whether the resulting constructs are “accurate” depictions of the normal or typical contract, 
or tort, or other obligation. As ideal types, they cannot be.  The question is, instead, whether 
the characteristics used in constructing a particular ideal type make it suitable for the 
purposes to which it is applied. What are the consequences of highlighting certain factors 
while omitting others? The concept itself – for example, ‘contract’ or ‘free consent’ – cannot 
justify this choice, because the concept is the result of this choice.  The justification must, 
therefore, be sought in factors that are independent of the concept. Birks’s work illustrates 
the pitfalls of ignoring these issues. Birks treated his categories – particularly the events 
which in his grid taxonomies were things that happened leading to responses, what the law 
did about the things that happened – as plain facts on the ground.64 As Samuel has pointed 
out they cannot just be facts, but normative interpretations of the facts simplified to identify 
the things we consider most relevant.65  This has a special significance to law.  The legal 
concern with questions de sententia ferenda makes the question of whether a particular 
instance deviates from an ideal type particularly important.  If free bargaining is a property of 
contract as an ideal type, and if a new type of interaction that has a contractual form does 
not display free bargaining, this absence could have significant implications for we whether 
should even put it in the “contract” category. But this is not an issue with which we can deal, 
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unless we recognise that the very category ‘contract’ as an ideal type is the result of, and 
embeds, normative evaluation. 
B. Evaluating concepts 
 
Why, then, is the interpretivist account of concepts resistant to recognising the evaluative 
decisions that underlie the creation of an ideal type such as ‘contract’?  Viewing legal 
concepts as ideal types points to another issue with the interpretivist understanding of 
concepts. 
Underlying the Birksian and much of the interpretivist view of taxonomy is the belief that 
every concept within a system must be independent of every other concept within that 
system. One concept may be a subset (or sub-concept) of another, but two concepts cannot 
overlap and this lay at the heart of the grids that Birks so often drew in his taxonomic work.  
‘Yellow’ is out of place in a classification that contains ‘carnivore, herbivore’ because both 
carnivores and herbivores can be yellow.   
McMeel described Birks as an academic jurist in the Roman law tradition.66 He was the 
closest thing English law had to a iurisconsult, and the continental positivist tradition 
represented by the iurisconsults was strongly Leibnizian. Leibniz believed that law was 
geometric.67 As such his and Birks’ views have parallels as the latter’s insistence on 
discrete, non-overlapping categories and the importance of his famous grids likewise 
indicates a geometric view of law.  For Leibniz, concepts existed and were eternally static, 
their proper domains merely needed to be delineated.  The positivist tradition on the 
continent rejected the idea that the law was rooted in right reason, but continued to accept 
the geometric paradigm. The result, as Kahn-Freund described,68 was an understanding of 
law that saw it as being unchanging in terms of its moral or normative imperatives. Its social 
functions change as society changes, as does the use to which it is put, but its normative 
core remains constant. 
The result is problematic. Interpretivists acknowledge, for instance, that a number of different 
systems of rights or obligations could emerge from the fundamental principles they outline. 
Nevertheless, they do not explain why we have ended up with the set we have. Yet it is this 
question that is central to the goals which taxonomic projects claim to pursue. Logic cannot 
get us from principle to rule to outcome,69 nor can simple axiomatic principles, nor can 
criterial definition. A semantic understanding of 'reasonable' or 'fair' or 'just' is never going to 
have enough content to do the work it is asked to do.  To attribute the descent to reflection, 
as Stevens does,70 is accurate enough but of little use unless it is accompanied by an 
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account of the content of the reflections in question. What is needed to enable ideal type 
concepts to operate in a developmental manner is an element of evaluation. Some 
interpretivist accounts, like Smith’s, recognise an evaluative moral element..71 Typically, 
however, such accounts – unlike realist accounts – do not seek to explain how this 
evaluation works in practice, or why it has produced the patterns of rights we see in our legal 
system.  In contrast, both Dworkin, who Smith rejects, and inclusive legal positivism, to 
which Smith seems closer in orientation, provide ways in which moral reasoning can be 
introduced into and constrain legal reasoning in hard cases, which an interpretivist could 
use.72  
C. From Concepts to Taxonomy 
So far, we have reached the point that legal concepts are not average or typical types: they 
are “ideal types” in Weberian terms. As such, in order to make sense of private law 
concepts, we need to consider the intension – the relationship between their sub-parts – and 
their extension – the fact scenarios to which they apply.  Turning concepts into taxonomies 
involves much the same procedure on a larger scale.  Remember that we defined 
taxonomies in the introduction to be partly about setting out the interrelationship between 
principles and concepts, and we defined concepts to be interrelationships of sub-concepts. 
The categories by which we taxonomise are also concepts which have sub-concepts and 
sub-categories, and considering their interrelationship, too, is a matter of both intension and 
extension.  There is, in consequence, never a choice between ‘contextual’ and ‘conceptual’ 
categories.  Taxonomies must include both. 
There is a useful analogy with Dworkin, whose views on this point are not wholly alien to 
either the realist tradition,73 or the interpretivists’ view. Hercules, faced with a novel or hard 
case starts with rules, 'ascends' to principles, and then 'descends' back to the specific case.  
The first of these, which Dworkin refers to as theoretical ascent, is straightforward, and 
relates to intension.74  It is easy to look at the law of contract and say that there is a principle 
there – part of the intension of ‘contract’ – of ‘voluntary consent’, even if we disagree about 
its precise scope and implication.  As we engage in the process of theoretical ascent, the 
concepts become much more general, and their intension simpler than that of more specific 
concepts. Estoppel for example has more to it than the higher-order reliance principle – 
simply and obviously because one of the components of the estoppel-concept is the 
reliance-concept.75 Descent, in turn, is not merely a matter of reflection: as we descend we 
are using the context in which the higher order principle (intension-statement) is to apply in 
working out its extension.  Hercules descends by deducing a lower level (more concrete) 
principle from the higher, and examining how consistent that lower level principle is with 
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other higher-level principles and other uncontroversial lower-level principles.  The process is 
dynamic: in hard cases there is likely to be some oscillation up and down.  
The contextual element to this goes beyond the simple sense that extension, as the set of 
real world problems to which the concept applies, is per se wholly contextual. In Dworkin’s 
theory, principles and the rights derived from them are trumps, but not absolute trumps.76 
Sometimes other things outweigh them. Principles have weight77 and compete against each 
other; their comparative weight will depend on context,78 and the existence of local priority 
demands as much. The extension of the cause of action in duress therefore in turn affects 
the intension of the unjust enrichment category-concept, or the intension of the consumer 
law category-concept to the extent that the complaint might be about hard-selling. Concepts 
and contexts are symbiotic, feeding off each other, and it is only by combining them that 
Hercules forms a picture of the legal system.  
The realist approach to taxonomy, similarly, intrinsically gives space to multiple sets of 
factors.  This does not, however, mean that it consists of sets of overlapping taxonomies. A 
better way of conceptualising the realist approach is to think about it as two (or multiple) 
axes, rather than two different sets of overlapping taxonomies. As with Hercules, one axis 
might represent the categories in which legal rules are expressed, while the other represents 
contextual factors.79  They might, for example, capture, respectively, the nature of the 
parties’ dealings and the impugned act (Consensual?  Contract.  Wrongful?  Tort.), and the 
nature of the relationship between the parties (Manufacturer-consumer?  Labourer-
Employer?). Each of these points to various considerations that are relevant but the precise 
combination of relevant considerations comes from the combination of both axes.  
There are clear points of agreement between this and Dworkin’s approach. Dworkin says 
hardly anything about the nitty-gritty of private law, although he does have an extensive 
discussion of his method in the context of damages for emotional distress in Law’s Empire,80 
but at the heart of his view of adjudication and democratic legitimacy is the question of 
whether a policy is deontological or consequentialist/context specific.81 The general 
principles and justifications used in a process of theoretical ascent may equally be drawn 
from different areas of law, much as in realist accounts.  Equally, although consequentialist 
goal-based policies can only be introduced for the first time by legislation, a court can 
legitimately interpret many statutes in a particular factual area which have broadly similar 
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consequentialist policies as creating new generalisable rights affecting the development of 
judge-made law.82   
From Dworkin’s perspective, therefore, one might describe a category like consumer law as 
a multi-dimensional object which has a location on a policy/consequentialist axis around 
paternalism and spreads on the contract/tort direction along another axis. These overlaps 
are unsurprising and Dworkin himself has said that the best interpretation of an area might 
appeal to principles that are independent and competing.83 Contract is another such object 
that spreads along a deontological/principle axis as far as autonomy and pacta sunt 
servanda, but reaches round to the consequentialist axis to limit some of the implications of 
this.  Similarly, in deciding the limits of duress and the types of pressure claimants must 
learn to live with, we must decide what duress is for.84  Are we interested in the effect on the 
claimant? What does it mean (at a higher level) to say his intention is vitiated? Are we more 
interested in what the defendant did? Does that make a difference to deciding the case 
before us? From a realist perspective having thought about these matters we can then 
adjust our rules and their application to make a better rule; for Dworkin to the extent that the 
decisions reflect different social mores, or could not have been given by a single consistent 
political official we must either reconcile them or dismiss some as wrong, and develop the 
law incrementally. 
This is not to deny the existence of practical differences. Dworkin will be more inclined to 
attach weight and precedence to higher order concepts and principles; this is a function of 
his view of rights as trumps,85 his conception of theoretical ascent and the need to always 
ask whether the reasons a judge or litigant employs justify one side or the other having a 
right to win.86 This method of seeing what different principles require and a concentration on 
their purpose and underlying rationale and the means by which they interact should be 
attractive to the interpretivist. Even the moral nature of the evaluative exercise is not, as we 
have seen, alien to all interpretivists. A contextualist and realist will be inclined to be less 
context-invariant and have more and smaller sub-categories. Equally contextualists might be 
disposed to viewing the values and goals underlying different areas of law as being 
incommensurable.87.  Dworkinians and interpretivists in contrast will not.  But these are in 
practical terms issues of detail, and a far cry from the virtually unbudgeable disagreement 
that has characterised the debate so far.   
4. Taxonomising shifting concepts 
Developmental taxonomies raise one final issue to which virtually no attention has been paid 
in the taxonomic debate, namely, how taxonomies should deal with changes in the meaning 
attached to concepts by the legal system or, more generally, to legal change and evolution. 
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The nature of this problem is somewhat easier to see if we return to the analogy with 
prescriptive grammar. The work of the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini is almost a perfect 
linguistic analogy of the idealised legal taxonomy.  Pāṇini’s grammar formulated a set of 
rules and classifications for Sanskrit which covered almost every single word, for every 
single tense, declension, mood, number and person that existed, in a manner that left no 
room for exceptions or irregular forms – every single form, even those that most other 
linguists would consider irregular, was covered by a rule based on an articulated principle. 
Yet the only reason Pāṇini could complete a taxonomy was because he was taxonomising a 
language with a view to freezing it in a particular state.  His system would never have to 
cope with sound shifts, or new words, because the purpose of his activity was to prevent 
those shifts or words by setting the language in stone.   
Pāṇini's grammar therefore tells us that the only way a taxonomy can be perfect is if we start 
off by knowing all the answers, and having the ability to permanently fix these answers as 
the right ones.  This is manifestly not true of legal cases.  An important characteristic of a 
hard case is that the correct legal outcome is at the very least a matter of vigorous argument 
yet to be concluded.  We have opinions or beliefs about how this is to be done with varying 
degrees of certainty, but because unlike Pāṇini's grammar nobody has conveniently 
classified a novel case as a class 2 noun or a class 4 noun, there is no authoritative source 
to which we can go to look up the answer. To deal with this, a legal taxonomy must provide 
guidance in relation to how both the intension and the extension of a concept evolve over 
time. Let us take an example. We regularly seek support for our positions in 19th century or 
even 18th century case law; yet we know for absolute historical certainty that an 18th century 
lawyer meant something rather different by contract than we do today. Indeed, given that the 
forms of action were alive and well, most of the time he would not have cared much, being 
more interested in whether assumpsit covered the case. At what point do we say the 
concept changed into something else? And how can we build the possibility of such shifts in 
the content of a concept into taxonomies, as we must do if they are to be developmental?   
There are significant weaknesses in both contextualist and interpretivist approaches to this 
question.  Realists, as we have seen, have heavily contextual understandings of concepts. 
The result is that realists see not just the extension but also the intension of a concept as 
being a type of evaluative framework which is socially and empirically grounded.  As a result, 
they accept that the normative basis of legal concepts shift as society changes. This is 
foundational to most variants of realism – it was the basis of the Scandinavian realist 
emphasis on identifying the ‘social evaluations’ underlying concepts,88 and is fundamental to 
the ‘new legal realism’ that has emerged in the United States in recent years.89   
This is because classical American realists tended to view concepts in the empiricist 
tradition of Hume and Locke. Concepts for those theorists are frameworks our reasoning 
creates, by identifying points that our mental representations – the ideal types in Weberian 
terms – of certain things have in common with our mental representations of certain other 
things (hence, 'vehicle', 'book', 'computer', ‘injustice’, ‘wrongfulness’, etc.). In the Lockean 
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empiricist tradition, there is nothing essential about a mental representation – they can 
change. This means that the question of the content of a legal concept is always an 
empirical question, to be answered by looking at what it stands for in the legal system. As 
the representations of transactions on which the legal system is built change, so will the 
concepts in which the law is expressed or discussed, and the categories to which particular 
rules or situations are assigned. So, for example, Blackstone does not deal substantively 
with contracts in his Commentaries, instead discussing them in passing as a means of 
transferring rights. To a realist, this poses no problem – all that happened was a slow shift in 
the representation of the underlying transactions within the legal system. As the 
understanding of transactions became less social and more economic, the old categories of 
assumpsit, master and servant, and so on into which the subject of contracting was divided 
faded away, to be replaced by a uniform category of contract. It is in this sense that 
concepts are both not autonomous and socially determined; given an empiricist 
understanding of concepts it would be a contradiction in terms to say otherwise. This is also 
the reason why realist categories tend to be anchored in concepts that are more evidently 
linked to social facts and circumstances. To the extent any concept derives its content from 
empirical facts, the more direct the link between a concept and the social facts to which it 
refers, the more reliable our engagement with it. 
Scholars using approaches related to interpretivism seem in contrast to identify with the 
Kantian tradition in philosophy – indeed Ernest Weinrib90 and Lionel Smith91 do so explicitly.  
Kant disagreed with the Lockean idea that fundamental categories are abstracted from the 
experience of our senses.  Instead, Kant argued that they were a product of our 
understanding, but only yielded knowledge in the realm of empirical experience. In Kant's 
telling, therefore, it is the concept of an object that keeps our knowledge from becoming an 
entirely arbitrary collection of raw sensory stimuli.  The idea of concepts as products of our 
understanding makes it easy to see why interpretivists, Dworkin, and positivists tend to 
prefer timeless conceptual categories and classificatory bases that are relatively delinked 
from society. For Dworkin we can see this in his argument against an empiricist view. In A 
Matter of Principle he suggests for example that the right answer thesis cannot hold if we 
believe truth needs to be demonstrated from “hard facts”; on a strictly empiricist 
metaphysical view there is no right answer, but slavery is (he says) still wrong just because it 
is, irrespective of whether that is known or not. It is a “moral fact”, but not a “hard” or 
empirical one, and one delinked from society at any given point in time.92 We can see the 
same type of assumption in the Leibnizian framework of Birks’ thought. Concepts there are 
static and – like in this Kantian telling – delinked from any given society. Equally, the Kantian 
view also explains why such theorists can hold categories – for example, ‘unjust enrichment’ 
- to have subsisted in a dormant state for centuries. From a Kantian perspective if we lack 
empirical experience of the circumstances in which the law of unjust enrichment is triggered, 
our categories will not yield knowledge because categories cannot yield knowledge of things 
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in themselves.  As a result, we will only have a collection of raw sensory stimuli; but this 
does not mean that the category itself has does not exist.   
The failure to recognise that interpretivist and contextualist taxonomies build on radically 
different understandings of concepts has led to a number of egregious failures to 
communicate. An example is Smith's Contract Theory, which says nothing at all about 
relational contract theory. The book suggests that this is because relational contract theory 
is not a theory of contract law.93 To a theorist who adopts an empiricist understanding of 
concepts, this is very literally unintelligible. 'Promises' (a theory Smith does discuss) and 
‘projections of uncertainty into the future' (the relational conception of contract) are simply 
two different mental representations of what contracts are. Each leads to a very different 
understanding both of the legal category labelled 'contracts', and of the choices and goals 
upon which the rules of law in that category are based, but the only essential difference 
between them as ways of constituting the category is that the conception of contracts as 
‘promises’ builds on a Kantian understanding of the nature of concepts, whereas the 
conception of them as projections of uncertainty is much more empirically derived.  To reject 
the latter, then, is to proceed on the implicit basis that only theories that build on a Kantian or 
idealist understanding of concepts can be theories of law – which, when asserted without 
further justification, amounts to assuming one’s conclusion.   
But this gap has deeper consequences when it comes to accounting for the way in which 
concepts change. The law often develops internally, through extending and refining 
concepts. Realists struggle to account for this or to work it into their theories of law, as 
shown by historians’ responses to Grant Gilmore’s thesis in relation to contract94 and 
Atiyah's Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, both of which were shown to have missed 
continuities in the law of contract.95 That concepts can sometimes be autonomous in the way 
they develop is hard to reconcile with a predominantly empirical theory of concepts. The 
inability to deal with the factual autonomy which concepts seem to show is a well-known 
shortcoming of realist accounts of the law, and explains  why many realists abandon 
concepts altogether, and discuss the law in consequentialist terms. The problem, however, 
is that judicial decision-making in the common law  is not a purely consequentialist process 
and judges do engage in significant amounts of close conceptual reasoning. In Australia for 
example estoppel has been extended incrementally through processes of conceptual 
reasoning so it is now possible to obtain compensation to the value of the promise made and 
relied on by the claimant,96 which leads to another conceptual question concerning the 
boundary with contract.    
This is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, of the work of those realists, such as Waddams, 
who do engage with concepts and doctrine, but whose starting point in setting out suggested 
categories, or routes to applying those categories, differs considerably from current doctrine.  
This is not to deny the very considerable value of this body of work in its own right.  
                                                     
93
 Smith (n 3) 8 
94
 R Austen-Baker ‘Grant Gilmore and the Strange Case of the Failure of Contract to Die after All’ (2002) 18 
JCL 1; G Gilmore The Death of Contract (Ohio State UP 1974)  
95
 PS Atiyah Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford Clarendon Press 1979); See e.g. John Baker's 
review in (1980) 43 MLR 467 
96
 Sidhu v Van Dyke [2014] HCA 19 
20 
 
However, it falls short in terms of assisting in answering questions de sententia ferenda, and 
in dealing with shifts that reflect a level of conceptual autonomy.   
The interpretivists’ Kantian approach faces an equally significant problem. The 
interpretivists, as we have seen, take a static view, holding that there is a right answer 
logically inherent in the immanent principles and rationales behind the law. It was “true” for 
Birks that knowing receipt should not be fault-based. The lawyer’s job is to get the law closer 
to that true position, worked out on the basis of static Leibnizian concepts and the rational 
deduction of logical boundaries between them. Whilst Birks said that taxonomies should 
always be kept under review, the Leibnizian basis of his work suggests that this was 
because of the possibility of logical error in our taxonomy rather than historical shifts.97 This 
implies that we cannot deal with shifts save by saying we had not previously properly 
grasped the concept; we have not grasped, say, that unjust enrichment demands knowing 
receipt be strict liability not fault-based. In a legal context, Birks’s argument was that those 
whose understanding of the concept of knowing receipt was that it entailed strict liability 
have a better grasp or mastery of the concepts than those who understand the action as 
fault-based.  Such an understanding is obviously inadequate as the basis of a 
developmental taxonomy, and it is also inadequate to facilitate the engagement with Dworkin 
that interpretivism needs as Dworkin does not distinguish between a concept and our grasp 
of it; a theory of legal concepts is no more than a theory of our understanding of law for 
him.98  . 
How, then, can we build an understanding of change into our very understanding of 
concepts?  Hegel’s theory of concepts provides one possible direction that should, at the 
least, be attractive to interpretivists. For Hegel the teleology of a thing is the notion of a 
sense of purpose inherent in the thing itself. The purpose is its essence, its most profound 
characterisation;99 the necessary structure of things manifests itself in a vision of the 
universe100 as the unfolding of an inner purpose. The all-embracing purpose inheres in the 
Universe itself – it is an internal and not an external purpose, and it is posited in order to fulfil 
the Concept.101 This can be drawn out as a parallel with a developmental taxonomy, or 
developmental aspects of concepts (which are derived from and help to derive the Concept) 
within those taxonomies. Hegel102 suggests a metaphor of the flower, whose purpose is 
immanent throughout the life of the flower from seed to pollination, but which goes through 
different stages of life. For Hegel conceptual content arises from the process of applying 
concepts – the determinate content of a concept is unintelligible apart from the process of 
development. For Brandom this provides an analogy with the law.103 He explains that for 
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Hegel it is for later users of the concept to decide whether earlier applications were correct 
on the basis of still earlier applications. The common law is nothing more than a sequence of 
applications of concepts to facts. Decided cases exercise authority over present ones by 
virtue of the fact that the reasons that a judge may take into account are contained in prior 
cases or inferentially related to those reasons.  Brandom argues for a negotiation between 
two poles of reciprocal Hegelian authority – what the content is for the past judges, and for 
the present judges.104 There is an analogy between Dworkin’s idea of law and the Concept 
in that both entail the development of an autonomous self-contained system, which, as we 
said earlier, is both backwards-looking and forward-looking.  An interpretivist should find this 
attractive because of the concentration on considerations inherent or immanent in the law, 
and self-contained within an autonomous system.  Whichever view is taken, however, will 
require them to engage with concepts properly and continually re-evaluate the categories 
they use rather than assuming their timeless perfection. 
 
Realists and contextualists will reject this idea because of their view on the inherently 
indeterminate nature of concepts, but they may find greater value in returning to early 
realism.  DiMatteo has argued that Llewellyn’s work had a conceptual track with parallels to 
Dworkin, and Llewellyn did indeed engage closely with shifting concepts.105  Corbin’s 
influential treatise on contract law, which provided distinctively realist accounts of core legal 
concepts such as consideration and estoppel, is an even clearer example.  From a 
methodological point of view, though, the Scandinavian realists, who saw concepts as 
embedding social evaluations, and recognised that these evaluations changed over time, 
provide an even more promising starting point.  Either way, however, more attention will 
need to be paid to the task of relating the context of the law back to the language in which 
the law is expressed, and to considering how legal concepts constrain and shape the 
manner in which the law responds to changing circumstances.106  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Over the last twenty years, private law theory has become boxed into silos. Allan Beever 
and Charles Rickett have even claimed that anyone not following their method is not doing 
law. Whilst this is a truly extra-ordinary claim, the discussion in this article explains both why 
they make it, and why it is misconceived.  Beever’s position on the incommensurability of 
policy with principle107 is particularly telling: if we assume that policy and principles can never 
be balanced, we have to get rid of one or the other. In truth, however, a view that principles 
and rights are important, and that we need to take account of their reach and interaction, 
does not imply such an extreme conclusion. Nor does an insistence that context matters 
imply that only consequences matter and that principles are so much hokum. The mistake 
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has been to take legitimate disagreements over the extent to which context is relevant, and 
turn them into battlegrounds of principle. Only by looking more closely at what legal 
categories are for, and how they change over time, can we really make progress.   
And progress is necessary, because the issues underlying the taxonomy debate are of 
growing importance to the common law.  In this article, we have argued that taxonomy – for 
instance whether misuse of private information should be seen as tortious or equitable, and 
what if anything should turn on that – cannot be done through definition or deterministic 
logical reasoning, but turns equally on questions of purpose (what purposes it serves to 
classify the wrong as a tort), context (the types of circumstances and relationships in which 
the action is invoked) and history (the implications of the action originating in equity rather 
than in case).  A static view of legal categories and their content is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of legal concepts and their use in the common law. 
This matters not just to the question of demarcating the boundary between contract and 
unjust enrichment, but to the far more fundamental question of the boundary between 
obligations and the administrative state.  It is beyond question that the role of the 
administrative state, and the categories of cases with which its agencies are directly 
concerned, have shifted very considerably over the twentieth century. Yet little consideration 
has been given to how this affects the position of the law of obligations, save when cases 
like Marcic v Thames Water108 have forced the issue.  This is inadequate.  Dealing with the 
spectacular growth of regulation, and the role of obligations in a legal system increasingly 
dominated by administrative and regulatory bodies, requires a new understanding of the 
categories into which we classify the law, which neither interpretivism nor realism have been 
able to provide. 
This article has set out a tentative outline of how we might achieve such an understanding.  
Much more work now needs to be done. Too much time over the past twenty years has 
been spent attacking the other side without appreciating that the antagonists are engaged in 
the same project, with the result that private law theorists are all too often fighting the battles 
of the past.   
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